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Abstract
Large scale systems such as the Grid need scalable and
efﬁcient resource allocation mechanisms to fulﬁl the re-
quirements of its participants and applications while the
whole system is regulated to work efﬁciently. Economics
inspired models have shown ability to handle efﬁciently the
allocation of resources and services, scaling up well as they
are decentralized. Our model considers the arbitration of
decisions at the local scope and short term, the regulation
of the system at global scope, and the sharing of informa-
tion between global and local environments. This paper
presents a scalable model and evaluates by simulation a
system where global market information circulates in ag-
gregated and scalable form, the rate of demand by par-
ticipants is globally regulated by a currency mechanism,
preference is regulated by a reputation mechanism, and lo-
cal regulation among competing participants is resolved
by auction mechanisms. The paper shows how scalable
systems beneﬁt from distributed marketplaces supporting
global information ﬂow to regulate and optimize local and
global behavior.
1. Introduction
The last years has seen the emergence of the Grid, large
scale and dynamic systems formed of thousands or even
millions of elements where participants use and provide re-
sources and services, join and leave the system at will. The
Grid requires mechanisms to regulate the share of resources
between such self-interested parties.
The principal issue for resource allocation is that of
arbitrating resource assignment when demand and supply
do not match. Straightforward arbitration policies such as
those based on priorities may be abused by users if they are
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free to set their own priorities. Hence, we require mecha-
nisms that provide users incentives to regulate their demand
or to self-limit. On the other hand, resource owners need
incentives such as economic compensation to share their re-
sources. Pricing of resources establishes common scales of
value across different resources. Market institutions such
as auctions may be used to price resources and to allocate
them to who value them the most.
Markets are an efﬁcient and fair allocation mechanism
and accommodate diversity in demand and supply. They are
recognized as suitable for heterogeneous environments such
as the Grid. Besides, markets are efﬁcient, adapt to ﬂuctu-
ating supply and demand and provide feedback on prices.
We propose a collection of efﬁcient, scalable and decentral-
ized mechanisms to regulate and optimize local and global
behavior allowing traders to adjust to changing market con-
ditions.
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents relevant market based resource allocation
frameworks. Section 3 points out some of their limitations
and motivates our discussion. An outlook on the component
architecture building our framework is presented in Section
4. Finally, Section 5 and 6 show preliminary simulation re-
sults and present our conclusions respectively.
2 Related Work
Recent years have seen a ﬂourish in research on market-
based Grid resource allocation though, in our analysis, few
address large-scale Grid.
Tycoon [9] is designed to trade time-shared networked
nodes and implements a proportional sharing auction where
each user is attributed a capacity proportional to its bid.
Such divisible usage of CPU is not appropriate to a wide
range of applications. Besides, a per-node auction as de-
signed in Tycoon does not scale in number of users and ma-
chines. Tycoon strictly assumes a closed economy where
consumers should be providers and it does not implement a
trust and reputation mechanism that aids users in selection
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of auctions. Besides, even though the market is decentral-
ized, Tycoon’s banking service is centralized.
GridBus [13] is a resource marketplace that uses non-
coordinated brokers to match tasks to resources. The system
is organized as a federation of resource nodes managed by
a set of co-operating brokers. Brokers of each node either
locally accept a submitted job or forward it to a cheapest
remote node. The assumption of co-operation can in general
not be warranted. A globally deployed reputation service to
regulate choice in the market with trust and conﬁdence is
not considered yet.
PeerMart [6] implements distributed auctions by asso-
ciating a broker for each resource/service type. Brokers
are implemented as peer-sets on a structured P2P overlay.
Synchronization of peers in the set and detection of mali-
cious behavior is necessary to avoid peers’ collusion when
modifying user’s accounts, although it introduces signiﬁ-
cant message overheads. Segmentation of markets puts the
onus on the clients to choose between equivalent resources.
Furthermore, PeerMart does not provide support tools to
formalize agreements amongst participants.
CATNETS [4] proposes a middleware architecture to
provide economic and market based resource management.
Scale is addressed by completely decentralized auctions.
Their mechanism avoids the knowledge of global informa-
tion such as an average price for a certain product in the
market. Additional services for the regulation of choice
such as global reputation and regulation of demand such as
currency are missing.
Recent work [5] focus on decentralized peer-assisted
content distribution by identifying highly demanded ﬁles
by means of pricing mechanisms. Besides, their system is
designed to fairly deliver content by rewarding most those
peers sharing highly demanded content. Therefore, they do
not consider price convergence using scalable global infor-
mation in the presence of different kind of resources to be
share –e.g CPU, storage or bandwith– such as in a Grid sce-
nario.
3 Motivation and scenarios
Market theory [12] provides mechanisms to regulate and
optimize resource allocation within a local (micro) and
global (macro) scope for large and dynamic systems. This
section presents a list of requirements to consider for an ad-
equate market infrastructure and scenarios where mecha-
nisms are introduced to address these requirements.
Fair allocation of resources with decentralized auctions.
The system must be perceived to be fair, i.e. to allocate
resources to those who value them most, but should ensure
that there is no lock-out or starvation of some traders.
Centralized auctioneers are a bottleneck in large scale re-
source markets. Decentralization may be addressed in dif-
ferent ways: PeerMart associates an item to an auctioneer
and manages a set of independent markets, but this does not
A
S
B
B
B
B
B
S
S
S
S
A
A
price = 80
price = 120
price = 100
(a) Independent markets
S
S
S
S
S
B
B
B
B
B
A
A
A
price = 99.9
price = 100
price = 100.1
(b) Market with global information
Figure 1. Market Scenario
prevent one auctioneer from becoming a hot-spot. Catnets
manages bi-lateral negotiations and provides scalable in-
frastructure for trading partners to locate each other. How-
ever consumers need to simultaneously negotiate with mul-
tiple partners in cases where a single provider cannot satisfy
the entire request leading to an exposure problem. In our
approach we do restrict the ways that the market may be
partitioned by supporting on-the-ﬂy creation of auctioneers
that could broker in one or more of the following ways:
² By resource type –e.g. CPU or storage market.
² By item –e.g. CPUs of 1Ghz.
² By location –e.g. traders in Barcelona or Sydney.
Auctioneers may also execute different types of auctions
–e.g. a combinatorial auction or a double auction. Such
a system with multiple independent and simultaneous auc-
tioneers may result in hot-spots and imbalance in number
of bidders or ratio of supply and demand creating inefﬁ-
ciency in allocation. Global awareness is required to help
the participants to make the right choice of auctioneers thus
preventing this imbalance.
Global information of the market. Global market aware-
ness is essential to design negotiation strategies that allow
participants to detect and select the best trading opportuni-
ties matching its business models. Bergemann’s survey [1]
demonstrates the importance of economic information dis-
closure and shows the increased attention paid to economic
information acquisition.
Traders require information that enables them to deduce:
entry prices, market at which they may efﬁciently partic-
ipate and when they participate. Centralized markets are
able to furnish the current information necessary for sim-
ple or sophisticated bidding strategies – such as ZIP agents
[11] or human traders. Therefore, this is an issue for dis-
tributed and segmented markets. Distribution and segmen-
tation of markets result in loss of information such as prices,
products and effective supply [2]. An efﬁcient information
system should allow participants to choose a compromise
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between exact global information and partial information.
Besides, aggregated, anonymized and summarized informa-
tion contribute to scalability and may in most cases be suf-
ﬁcient.
Global information is necessary to cope with locality and
heterogeneity of pricing. Distributed auctions in any of the
previously cited ways could result in the system fragment-
ing into independent and isolated trading clusters. The ex-
pected result is divergence in prices and inefﬁcient alloca-
tions. Figure 1(a) shows a scenario of fragmentation in a
decentralized environment. Sellers and buyers are trading
in different markets with no information exchange between
the different instances. Moving traders between auctions
could help prices to converge as shown in Figure 1(b).
Flexibility in settlement. The resource market architecture
should also support the settlement phase –i.e. payment and
delivery of resources. Different kind of resources and their
usage may need different payment protocols. Thus, the set-
tlement process should be ﬂexible.
The auctioneer matches winning consumer bids and
provider offers and establishes the transaction prices. At
this stage, contractual negotiations –such as the payment
method– must be initiated. Thus, traders should reach an
agreement on the charging method as for example:
² Pay before service: it is appropriate for grid services
where the cost has been established before access and
is independent of the real usage. It is also apposite
when consumers are not trusted –e.g. a directory ser-
vice, where the client pays once for using it as many
times as necessary.
² Pay after service: this is suitable when service cost
is unknown beforehand or when consumers are trusted
–e.g. the user acquires one CPU for 1e/hour but the
real usage may be shorter.
² Pay during service: this payment mechanism is ap-
propriate when trust relationships are not well estab-
lished. Either party may terminate the contract during
its lifetime if the counterparty does not respect obli-
gations, therefore being a potential building block for
trust relationships.
Incentives and limitations for regulation. Currency acts
as an accounting mechanism in a closed market where
providers are also consumers and provides incentives in an
open market where providers may exchange its gain against
real purchasing power in the open world.
Besides, currency is a medium of exchange that allows
Grid clients to express the value of their jobs. The amount
of currency owned by a user is a ceiling on its purchase
power. Markets fail when endowments are inﬁnite. Traders
for Grid resources manage their ﬁnite endowment or budget
over a period of time. It is clear, that greater the budget
of a trader is, greater its opportunity to acquire the desired
resources.
For example, an application may be adjusted to variable
quantities of resources over time but must ﬁnish within a
speciﬁed time frame. During this period, the application
manages its assigned budget so as to sustain its resource re-
quirements, bidding for resources which ﬁts better its utility
function –i.e. taking into account the remaining budget and
its resource requirements.
Market conﬁdence and trust. Any system requires a
mechanism through which any user can be accounted to in-
ﬂuence future choices. Accounting of pasts actions can be
used to evaluate user’s reputation and provide valuable in-
formation to other users in the Grid.
A reputation mechanism constitutes an incentive to Grid
users to act correctly. Reputation can be used to limit the ef-
fects of dishonest users in the Grid, or to evaluate the qual-
ity of service provided by a market. Thus, markets offering
poor quality of service may have low reputation discour-
aging Grid users to place bids on them. Although many
approaches exist for maintaining decentralized global rep-
utation [8], there is no market framework providing such
information as a core service for markets.
When a contract between a seller and a buyer ﬁnalizes,
a process to qualify the perceived quality of service must
be initiated. Buyers and sellers make use of reputation to
qualify the service received by their counterpart. Reputa-
tion provides incentives to sellers to offer good quality of
service. For buyers, it constitutes an incentive to act hon-
estly so as to be able to be accepted in future negotiations.
Reputation provides measures of conﬁdence and trust to the
market. Markets can also have its reputation that can be
based on the reputation of sellers and buyers participating
in them. Thus, markets with higher reputation may be re-
stricted to users with at least certain degree of reputation.
Besides, bid submission to markets may also be restricted
by the reputation of the bidder.
4 Architecture
We present an architecture, which fulﬁl the challenges
and scenarios presented in Section 3. Figure 2(a) shows the
different layers of the Grid market infrastructure. The bot-
tom layer, P2P Overlay, has to deal with basic requirements
of distributed systems such as scalability and robustness
against failure and churn. Therefore, we choose a structured
p2p overlay in order to take proﬁt of its self-* properties.
The middle layer is divided into the market component and
resources, which use the same communication framework
for their interaction. The market component consists of the
following ﬁve components or services:
² Market: The Market Service is a component that me-
diates the allocation of resources. It can implement
different market mechanisms such as double auctions
or combinatorial auctions in a extensible way.
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(a) Market-Based Grid Architecture (b) Interaction on a decentralized market-based Grid
Figure 2. Decentralized Market Framework
² Market Information: This component provides infor-
mation to individual market participants such as sell-
ers, buyers or auctioneers. Thus, it uses a publish-
subscribe model to inform market participants ef-
ﬁciently and in a decentralized manner with time-
sensitive information using a scalable and distributed
information aggregation mechanism to handle the load
and volume of participants, requests and events in a
potentially large scale system [2].
² Currency Management: This component provides
a mechanism to manage user’s accounts representing
they current purchase power and a history of transac-
tions in which it has been engaged. Thus, it uses an en-
hanced DHT able to handle concurrent account modi-
ﬁcations when transactions are performed [10].
² Agreement Manager: it provides sellers and buyers
with ﬂexibility in how to carry out the trading. In
Grid applications, the decision of executing the settle-
ment before or after using the product (resources or
services), results in signiﬁcant difference for users and
application.
² Trust and Reputation: Trust is achieved by a dis-
tributed component that accounts reputation of market
participants. The component aggregates local trust val-
ues without a centralized storage and management fa-
cility providing minimal overhead.
The presented scenarios in Section 3 shows how indi-
vidual challenges are addressed. As a result of complex
markets, those challenges might be handled entirely by the
presented market infrastructure as depicted in Figure 2(b).
This interaction diagram depicts an use case for buying
a resource from a provider. This way, buyer agents may
request from theMarket Information component an average
or minimum price, depending on its negotiation strategy.
Derivating the price from this information, it sends a bid
for the resource to the Auction component. Similarly, the
Seller agent publish an offer for its resources to the market.
After the auction successfully matches offer with bids
and sends feedback to the market information, an agreement
must be reached through the Agreement Manager compo-
nent component.
Depending on the settlement mechanism negotiated, it
sends the agreement to both traders informing of the price
and the settlement process begins by paying for resources
acquired through the Currency Management component
and, ﬁnally, accessing and using the resources in exchange
for the payment ticket.
5 Simulation Results
We have performed simulations on different market sce-
narios to assess the importance of market components pre-
viously presented and their capacity to inﬂuence and drive
traders to a certain equilibrium. For that purpose we have
developed a simulator based on GridSim [3] with different
modules representing currency management, market infor-
mation and an auctioneer performing a persistent shot dou-
ble auction [11], similar to a continuous double auction.
The main objective of the simulations is to point out how
mechanisms presented through this paper helps to regulate
the system as a whole following simple strategies. There-
fore, to simulate an adaptive behavior of individual traders
in a certain market, we base our bidding algorithm on ex-
tended ZIP agents [11] which are able to reach an equilib-
rium price depending on market supply and demand with a
simple strategy based on the maximum and minimum price
of previous bids.
The presence of global market information enables two
different agent strategy depending on how they use global
information: (a) to change bid pricing in the current auction
according to global information and (b) to evaluate whether
the current auction is the most adequate or move to another
auction.
In the ﬁrst case, since agents base their pricing strategy
on information coming from an aggregate of auctioneers,
the effect will be that, despite which auction agents partici-
pate in, the outcome will be the same, being equivalent to a
single distributed auction. Whereas in the second, auctions
are independent and participants may use global informa-
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Figure 3. Effect of global information on dif-
ferent market scenarios
tion to decide moving to other auctions more adequate to
their needs, leading to a self-distribution of supply and de-
mand between different auctions.
We have done two experiments to evaluate the market
behavior depending on the agent strategy, by observing the
evolution of market prices. In each experiment, approxi-
mately 100 buyers and sellers participate in a setting with 3
auctions with different degrees of imbalance between sup-
ply and demand, although the total supply and demand was
adjusted to match. After an initial phase without global in-
formation, both experiments differ in how agents react to
the global market information they receive.
Figure 3(a) and 3(b) illustrate the effect of these two dif-
ferent behaviors. The initial part of both ﬁgures shows how
three different markets with different supply/demand ratio
evolve to a different price equilibrium –i.e. Market 1 suf-
fers from inﬂation due to a higher supply; on the other hand,
Market 2 and 3 suffers from deﬂation as they have more
providers than customers. This initial behavior can be ob-
served in a system with multiple independent auctions such
as PeerMart.
The other half of both ﬁgures shows different behaviors
when agents are informed of global market information. On
one hand, Figure 3(a) shows how traders use this informa-
tion to adjust the price of their bids in the current auction.
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Figure 4. Effect of currency regulation
The result is the adaptation of prices among all auctions to
a common equilibrium price as if all traders were partici-
pating in a single market. The ﬁgure shows an stable price
given that global supply and demand was designed to be
balanced, although traders continue trading in separate un-
balanced auctions.
On the other hand, Figure 3(b) shows how traders use
this information to move to other auctions more adequate
for their needs –e.g. buyers move to cheaper auctions and
sellers to auctions with higher price. The result is the adap-
tation of supply and demand in different auctions leading
to an independent price equilibrium for each auction. It
shows how the matching price is affected by the movement
of agents – points in the ﬁgure – amongst markets.
The effect of introducing currency and budget con-
straints in the system as a long-mid term regulation mech-
anism of individual usage has been also evaluated. For this
purpose, we set up an scenario where a ﬁxed budget is pro-
vided to each trader as in an open economy. After a certain
amount of time –called epoch–, the budget of buyers is re-
set with a ﬁxed budget, similarly to [7]. Thus, agents are
forced to administer their expenditure strategy to maximize
their outcomes.
Therefore, at the end of each epoch agents check their
remaining budget and decide whether they should increase
their spending rate –e.g. in case they did not spent all the
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budget– or decrease it –e.g. in case they ran out of budget
too quickly.
Thus, we measured two dimensions of the effect intro-
duced by currency: price contention and proportional share
of allocations. To do so, we simulated a long term scenario
(100 epochs of 1000 rounds each) where traders (100 buyers
and 100 sellers) try to acquire as many resources as possi-
ble taking into account that their budget is refunded at some
time interval. Besides, each agent is supplied with a cer-
tain uniformly distributed random budget representing their
purchase power. Although the presented results are based
on a uniformly wealth distribution, other wealth distribu-
tion such as Pareto shows similar long term behavior.
For the case of price contention, in case agents have an
unlimited budget, they might increase their outcomes fol-
lowing a greedy bidding algorithm by increasing the prices
arbitrarily but resulting in a high level of inﬂation. Figure
4(a) shows how agents are forced to adjust their bids to their
assigned budget. This way, currency constitutes a price reg-
ulation mechanism during peak demand periods.
Regarding proportional share allocations, an interesting
property introduced alongside with currency is the distinc-
tion between traders depending on their budget. The more
budget a trader has, the easier should be to achieve its own
goals –i.e. maximize the number of allocations in this ex-
periment. Figure 4(b) depicts a linear and proportional rela-
tion between the assigned budget and their share of alloca-
tions as agents try to adjust their spending rate – therefore,
their potential allocations – during different epochs.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we discussed the functionalities needed
to achieve a decentralized resource allocation mechanism
based on markets. Related work fail to address resource al-
location in large scale Grids considering both the local and
global behavior. Mainly, decentralized markets for large
scale Grids require mechanism to account and limit users
activity, express users preferences in an scalable manner,
provide incentives to consumers and providers to act hon-
estly, provide ﬂexible an conﬁgurable settlement policies
and provide mechanisms to gather distributed information
so as to enable users to be informed about the global state
of the economy.
The model and architecture proposed provides not only
mechanisms to regulate present concurrent resource alloca-
tion needs by decentralized auctions and settlement mech-
anisms, but also provides mechanisms for the global cir-
culation of information with a decentralized market infor-
mation service, the regulation of trading with currency to
inﬂuence the capacity to demand or offer of individual
participants and reputation mechanisms to inﬂuence future
choices. Therefore we provide a scalable and decentralized
system that can work and can be regulated on the large-scale
as it was a small-scale centralized system. Finally, our pre-
liminary results show how those mechanisms can be used to
regulate the overall system and inﬂuence selﬁsh individual
participants to reach a global fair behavior.
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